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Usually when we think of law making, we think of the activities of Congress or 
state legislatures.  Students of law and government may also think of the rule-making 
activities of federal2 or state3 bureaucracies.  More recently, some attention has been paid 
to the lawmaking power known as prosecutorial discretion (the decision of whether or for 
what crimes to charge a criminal defendant)4 or judicial discretion in sentencing.5
However, so far most of this work has been theoretical or, at best, anecdotal.  Further, far 
less attention has been paid to the ubiquitous activities of the bureaucrat who must decide 
whether or not to take action in a particular case, though a few articles in law and 
political science have addressed the topic recently.
1 College of Law, Department of Family Medicine, and Department of Public Health, University of 
Iowa.  Many thanks to the research assistants who collected census data for this project.  They include 
Nicholas Keppel and Sarah Koehler.  Stephanos Bibas provided substantial advice and guidance.
2 For just a sampling of the more recent, B.J. Sanford, Midnight Regulations, Judicial Review, and 
the Formal Limits of Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782 (2003) (arguing that it is illegal for 
administrative agencies to delay implementation of directives promulgated by outgoing presidents at the 
request of a new president.  Further, these delays offer the judiciary a rare chance to review presidential 
rulemaking); William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence over 
Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2002) (discussing what the author calls a troubling aspect of the 
administrative process, the practice of ex parte Office of Management and Budget (OMB) participation in 
rulemaking, and the potential for judicial and legislative checks on that participation); Stephanie Stern, 
Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589 
(2002) (analyzing consistency theory in federal rulemaking and arguing that notice and comment 
rulemaking actually diminishes genuinely effective public input by encouraging agency lock-in through 
premature commitment to a proposal).
3 See, e.g., Donna E. Blanton, State Agency Rulemaking Procedures and Rule Challenges, 75-JAN 
FLA. B. J. 34 (2001) (discussing the recent struggles between the state legislature and the courts in trying to 
regulate administrative agencies and impose on them a duty to treat their policies as rules and apply those 
rules consistently); William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 147 (1991); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State 
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1991) (arguing that state agencies 
should implement policies that are based on comprehensive rationality, in that they are politically 
acceptable, technically sound, lawful and fair).
4 A recent incident involves the charging and indictment of Martha Stewart for securities fraud, and 
various criminal charges allegedly resulting from attempting to cover up this activity.  See, e.g., USA 
Today, June 5, 2003.
5 James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an Independent Judiciary, 56 U. MIAMI L. R. 
507 (2002) (discussing the usurpation by the Florida legislature of the Florida Supreme Court’s rulemaking 
authority over the judicial branch through recent legislation and questioning whether the Supreme Court 
should assert its inherent control over the judicial branch).
2This study looks systematically at bureaucratic discretion in a particular case: that 
of the detection and substantiation of domestic elder abuse, but then generalizes to other 
fields that feature administrative discretion.  As with some other agencies, the social 
services officials who decide whether or not to police elder abuse are constrained.  They 
suffer from lack of money, understaffing, and occasionally a real confusion of roles.6  We 
will also see that even with the best of intentions and the elder’s interest at stake they 
may be reluctant to enforce the law because they do not see a better situation for the 
elder.7
The law as it is written forbids abuse of dependent or vulnerable elders.8  In the 
domestic (non-institutional) situation we consider here, all states charge adult protective 
6 See, e.g., Iowa City Press Citizen 6/18/03.
7 DAVID A. WOLFE, ELDER ABUSE INTERVENTION:  LESSONS FROM CHILD ABUSE AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE INITIATES, IN ELDER MISTREATMENT:  ABUSE, NEGLECT AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING 
AMERICA 501, 507 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace, eds., National Research Council of the 
National Academies 2003), notes that “the dominant theme in most services to maltreating families remains 
that of protection, not treatment.  This conundrum leaves inadequate services available to the larger number 
of parents who are at risk of child abuse or neglect and who could benefit the most from early 
intervention….”.
8 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 368 (2002):
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that crimes against elders and dependent adults 
are deserving of special consideration and protection, not unlike the special 
protections provided for minor children, because elders and dependent adults may be 
confused, on various medications, mentally or physically impaired, or incompetent, 
and therefore less able to protect themselves, to understand or report criminal 
conduct, or to testify in court proceedings on their own behalf.
(b)(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder or dependent adult, with 
knowledge that he or she is an elder or a dependent adult, to suffer, or inflicts 
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody 
of any elder or dependent adult, willfully causes or permits the person or health of 
the elder or dependent adult to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the elder or 
dependent adult to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is 
endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, 
or by a fine not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000), or by both that fine and 
imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.
N.Y. Penal Law § 260.34 (McKinney, 2000) provides:
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a vulnerable elderly person in the first 
degree when, being a caregiver for a vulnerable elderly person:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to such person, he or she causes serious physical 
injury to such person; or
3services investigators (usually an arm of the state health and human services departments) 
with collecting reports, investigating, and substantiating elder abuse.9  If abuse is 
“founded,”10 these written laws provide for criminal charges against the abuser,11 services 
for the elderly victim,12 appointment of a guardian,13 and/or removal from the home 
situation.14
The law as it is enforced may require social service officials to act not only as 
distributors of adult protective services but also, perhaps even in the same family, as child 
protectors.  In child welfare investigations, the written rules require that families be kept 
2. He or she recklessly causes serious physical injury to such person.
Endangering the welfare of a vulnerable elderly person in the first degree is a class D 
felony.
9 See, e.g., Del. Stat. Ti. 31 sec. 3904 (1), (6); NM Stat 27-7-19 (investigation, substantiation and 
written report).  A complete list (with citations) appears at 
http://www.elderabusecenter.org/default.cfm?p=statelaws.cfm#finding.  A listing of the mandatory 
reporting laws in Gerald F. Jogerst et al., Required Elder Abuse Education for Iowa Mandatory Reporters, 
15 J. Elder Abuse & Neglect 1 15-21 & Appendix A (2003). For a discussion of the origin of the laws, and 
the effects of the legislation and regulations on investigations, substantiations, and bureaucratic efficiency, 
see Margaret F. Brinig et al., The Public Choice of Elder Abuse Law, 33 J. LEGAL STUDS. 517 (2004).
10 This means that it is determined by the agency to have likely occurred.  See, e.g., Ia. Code § 
235B.9(i) (2001): “1. Dependent adult abuse information which is determined by a preponderance of the 
evidence to be founded, shall be sealed ten years after the receipt of the initial report of such abuse by the 
registry unless good cause is shown why the information should remain open to authorized access.”
11 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 17b-460:  If as the result of any investigation…a determination is 
made that a caretaker or other person has abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned an elderly person, such 
information shall be referred in writing to the appropriate office of the state’s attorney, which shall conduct 
such further investigation, if any is deemed necessary and shall determine whether criminal proceedings 
should be initiated… 
12 See, e.g., Conn. Agencies Regs. 17b-461-1 (“services necessary to prevent abuse, neglect, 
exploitation, or abandonment;”);  Del Stat. Tit. 39, sec. 3904(b)(including among other things “social 
casework, maintenance in own home through provision of home health care, etc., assistance in obtaining 
out-of-home services such as respite care, emergency housing and placement in a rest-residential 
home…”).
13 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 17b-456:  If the Commissioner of Social Services finds that an 
elderly person is being abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned and lacks capacity to consent to 
reasonable and necessary protective services, he may petition the Probate Court for appointment of a 
conservator…
14 See, e.g., Del. Stat. Tit. 31 sec. 3903(f):  “The Department shall make continuing provisions in 
each county for the shelter of those persons who are determined to be in temporary need of such protection 
pursuant to …this title.  In providing this service, the Department may utilize existing resources such as 
state institutions; it may contract for bed space in private facilities; and it may utilizes the resources of rest 
(family care and residential) homes for those clients not requiring medical care.”
4together if at all possible consistent with the protection of the child.15  No such rule or 
policy16 keeps elders in their home situations.  The alternative may be less familiar and 
less personal nursing home care, which the elder may vehemently not want.17
Furthermore, many of the field workers charged with doing the investigations 
were trained and hired originally to do child welfare work.18  For them, Adult Protective 
Service (APS) investigations may be an unfamiliar and unwelcome additional duty, one 
15 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, codified as amended, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 671, 675, 473A, 1320a-9. 629a (1994 & Supp. V 1995-2000); set forth in part and discussed in 
CARL SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND 
PERSPECTIVES AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES 1004-1006 (2d ed., West Group 2000), and further discussed 
in Marcia Lowery, Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 447 (1997) (arguing that child welfare and 
adoption standards are interpreted as if there could be a single set of standards to govern all cases; the 
author argues that the correct results could differ widely based on the facts in each case, from the child 
staying with the family, to temporary removal, to permanent adoption, and that child welfare statutes 
should reflect the possibilities of different results).  Sec. 2 (a)(ii), (II) provides that the “reasonable efforts” 
to reunify the family will not be necessary where the child has been subjected to aggravated circumstances, 
as defined by state law, and including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and sexual abuse, or where the 
parental rights with respect to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.  States must initiate or join 
proceedings to terminate parental rights when children under 10 have been in foster care for 18 months of 
the most recent 24 months, unless the child is being cared for by a relative or the state documents a 
compelling reason for determining that filing a termination petition would not be in the best interests of the 
child, or the state has failed to provide to the child’s family such services as the state deems appropriate.  
Id. Sec. 3. 
16 There is a constitutionally supported presumption that parents serve their children’s best interests, 
articulated in such Supreme Court cases as Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (no need for  pre-
commitment hearing involving substantial due process protection when parents “voluntarily commit” a 
child to a psychiatric institution despite the stated concern that parents could “railroad” difficult children); 
and Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (state and third parties cannot interfere with the decisions 
about visitation made by a fit parent acting in an intact family because of parental autonomy).
The policy supporting family autonomy is described in Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 
(Ala. 1958)(“It would be anomalous to hold that a court of equity may sit in constant supervision over a 
household and see that either parent’s will and determination in the upbringing of a child is obeyed, even 
though the parents’ dispute might involve what is best for the child.”)  See generally Margaret F. Brinig, 
Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733 (2001)
17
"All my life, I have feared being neglected in a nursing home, and now I know what it is like . . . . 
I don't want anyone else to suffer like this."  Jonathan Riskind & Lee Leonard, State Might Narrow Scope 
of Nursing- Home Abuse Suits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, March 5 2002 at 1A (quoting Helen Love, who 
suffered abuse in a nursing home in California).
18 Certainly protection against child abuse has a much longer history.  For example, family violence 
activities funded by the Center for Disease Controls, Family Violence Branch, have just added funding for 
elder abuse projects within the last two years.  See Eben M. Ingram, Expert Panel Recommendaitons on 
Elder Mistreatment Using a Public Health Framework, 15 J. Elder Abuse & Neglect 45, 46 (2003).
Wolfe, supra note 7, at 501 states: “Efforts to understand and deal with abuse of the elderly by 
family members or other caregivers are reminiscent of where the study of child abuse and woman abuse 
was 20 years ago.”
5that seems less attractive because children in trouble can be placed in happier situations 
and show real improvement,19 while the elder will ultimately deteriorate and sooner, 
rather than later, die.  Thus the elder who has been abused may not get to a “better 
place.”20
Discretion given to legal agents, regardless of the type, proves integral to the 
phenomenon we study here.  In our system of government, both the executive and 
judicial branches of government have opportunities to exercise discretion.  Discretion, 
and concern about abuses of it, has concerned policy makers since the founding of the 
republic.  For example, one of the most important constitutional law cases, Marbury v. 
Madison21 concerns the Presidential power to pardon, which gives virtually unlimited 
discretion to the chief executive.22
Judges have tremendous discretion over the cases they hear, for their decisions 
aren’t reversed on appeal unless “clearly erroneous,”23 arbitrary and capricious,”24 or 
“abuses of discretion.”25  Yet the Federal sentencing guidelines were developed to 
19 Margaret F. Brinig, Moving toward a First-Best World:  Minnesota's Position on Multiethnic 
Adoptions, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 553 (2001) (exploring the reasons behind Minnesota’s decision to 
favor racial matching in adoption placements despite federal legislation requiring states to ignore race in 
favor of swifter permanent placement of children); Wolfe, supra note 7, at 507.
20 This is the goal of the child welfare system, according to the Child Welfare League.  See A 
Family’s Guide to the Child Welfare System 96 (2003), downloaded from 
www.cwla.org/childwelfare/fg10.pdf.
21 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 (1803).
22 Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United 
States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L. J. 85, 148 (2002) (exploring the nature and scope of the presidential 
pardoning power and concluding that some pardon challenges are justiciable questions and that the slight 
limitations to the pardoning power may be just enough to prevent abuses).
23 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 25341, 2535 (2004) (sentencing under Washington 
law)
24 See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204, 2206 (setting aside decision of 
agency not to prepare an environmental impact statement).
25 See, e.g., Ash v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 783, 2785 (2004)(award of preliminary injunction issued under 
Child Online Protectin Act)
6constrain discretion in sentencing,26 limiting federal sentencing judges to 25% ranges 
allowed by the sentencing grid.27  Even poverty lawyers must daily decide which of their 
many potential clients to represent at hearings, exercising discretion that will critically 
affect the lives of these people.28
Prosecutorial discretion has been the focus of criticism and commentary for more 
than forty years.29 A recent criticism by Angela Davis30 notes that “prosecutors daily 
exercise practically unlimited discretion and engage in similar controversial investigative 
practices [to the independent counsel].”31  Davis asserts that such discretion leads to 
abuses based upon race and class,32 citing cases such as United States v. Armstrong,33
26 Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost:  Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Grail of Uniformity 
and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 657 (2003) (arguing that the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the use of fact-finding during sentencing have forced judges to ignore the 
traditional goals behind the imposition of prison sentences).
27 Id. at 676.
28 Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L. J. 2567 (1993) (critiquing the widespread 
use of discretion and ethical judgment by poverty lawyers in case selection and strategy in poverty law 
cases).
29
Over forty years ago, Kenneth Karst observed, "and this is by no means an indictment of 
our attorneys general, any high political official may be expected to approach rather 
cautiously the investigation of charges that respectable trustees are guilty of wrongdoing 
or even mismanagement." Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An 
Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 478-79 (1960).
Cited in Evelyn J. Brody, WHOSE PUBLIC? PAROCHIALISM AND PATERNALISM IN 
STATE CHARITY LAW ENFORCEMENT, 79 Ind. L.J. 937 (2004).  
30 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:  Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001) (comparing the powers, practices, and  policies of the independent counsel with 
those of ordinary state and federal prosecutors and concluding that any distinctions between Kenneth 
Starr’s alleged abuses during his investigation of President Clinton and the activities of normal prosecutors 
are illusory); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560-
1572 (1981) (suggesting a need to reexamine the broad and casual acceptance of prosecutorial discretion 
and arguing that the current scope of discretion is unjustifiably broad not only in terms of the principles of 
fairness, equity, and accountability on which our system of criminal justice is based, but also in terms of 
those considerations thought by the supporters of prosecutorial discretion to justify its existence).
31 Id. at 397.
32 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 13 (1998) (examining prosecutorial discretion as a cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice 
system and arguing the prosecutors make decisions that contribute to the discriminatory treatment of 
African Americans as both criminal defendants and victims of crime).
33 Davis, supra note 32, at 32 (citing Untied States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996)).
7which based a selective prosecution claim on a study showing the government failed to 
prosecute non-black defendants for cocaine and crack-related offenses.
Daniel Richman reviewed prosecutorial discretion using an administrative law 
perspective to understanding the enforcement bureaucracy.34  Richman notes that the 
ability of one U.S. Attorney’s Office to take cases from another jurisdiction reduces the 
ability of each office to leverage its gate keeping power into control of those agencies’
agendas.35 Richman also discusses the “culture clash” between prosecutors and the 
investigative agents with whom they must work.36 William Stuntz criticized the 
unfettered discretion of prosecutors (as opposed to judicial discretion) noting that the 
problem is caused because “strong legislative supremacy and strong prosecutorial 
discretion don’t mix—they produce the kind of power imbalance that reinforces rather 
than corrects itself.”37
Of course, though observations about prosecutorial discretion are instructive, the 
problem studied here is a bit different.  The APS workers surveyed do not themselves 
handle the criminal cases, which are referred to local law enforcement.38  The burden of 
proof for a “founded” case of elder abuse need not rise to the same level as the “beyond a 
34 Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 749, 750 (2003) (showing how the iterated interactions between agents (police) and prosecutors will 
affect investigative and adjudicative decisionmaking and the allocation of enforcement resources and 
suggesting that the distinctive incentives of prosecutors and agents can most productively be harmonized if 
the two enforcement elements are seen as mutually monitoring members of a working group.).  
35 Id. at 760.
36 Id. at 789-791.  This may be true of the Adult Protective Services workers described here as well, 
though such an investigation is beyond the scope of the present study.
37 William J. Stuntz, Reply:  Criminal Law's Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 839 (2002) (arguing 
that prosecutorial discretion cannot simply be abolished, and even were it possible, abolition would 
probably do more harm than good. But prosecutorial power can be reined in, by reining in substantive 
criminal law).
38 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 17b-460:  If as the result of any investigation…a determination is 
made that a caretaker or other person has abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned an elderly person, such 
information shall be referred in writing to the appropriate office of the state’s attorney, which shall conduct 
such further investigation, if any is deemed necessary and shall determine whether criminal proceedings 
should be initiated…
8reasonable doubt” standard required under the criminal system.39  The focus is on 
protection of the elder and provision of services, not on retribution, deterrence and other 
goals of the criminal justice system.40  In fact, because the emphasis differs, APS workers 
have been criticized for failing to preserve evidence needed for subsequent criminal 
prosecutions.41  This criticism leads to calls for teams of investigators, one member of 
which who would be associated with the local law enforcement community.42
Cooperation between social services and law enforcement is advantageous for the victim 
but difficult for the professionals who are unlikely to master both a service plan and a
crime focus during the investigation.43
Turning once again to a more generalized discussion of discretion, we note that in 
1987, Gary Bryner wrote that elaborate efforts designed to constrain discretion in 
regulatory agencies has become something like a national obsession, and has undermined 
the effectiveness of regulatory programs without decisively narrowing the scope of 
discretion.44  He pointed out that the new requirements have elaborated on administrative 
law and procedure to ensure fairness to and participation by affective groups, that 
agencies have been required to perform extensive scientific and cost-benefit analyses to 
39 Compare Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy For Battered Women:Lessons From Navajo 
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 58 (1999)(protective orders in domestic violence cases).
40 See, e.g., People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305-06 (1981); see generally Michael J. Stacchini, 
Note, Nichols v. United States: Narrowing The Sixth Amendment Guarantee To Counsel , 75 B.U. L. REV. 
1233, 1252-53 (1995); Comment, Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis Of An 
Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 778-79 (1987).
41 I heard this myself from a practicing attorney in an alumni conference at the University of Iowa, 
held in the fall of 2003.  Compare Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough For Government Work: The 
Constitutional Duty To Preserve Forensic Interviews Of Child Victims, 65 L. & CONT. PROBS. 179, 193 
(2002)(child abuse and testimony of child victim).
42 Wolfe (2003), supra note 7 at 512.
43 B.K. Payne, B.L. Berg, & J. Toussaint, J., The Police Rresponse to the Criminalization of Elder 
Abuse:  An Exploratory Study, 24 POLICING:  AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICE STRATEGIES & 
MANAGEMENT, 605 (2001).
44 GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION:  LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 2 (Pergamon Press, 1987).
9support their decisions, and that both Congress and the executive have intensified 
political oversight of agency rulemaking.  Meanwhile, he argued, although these changes 
have increased the costs and length of time required to navigate the administrative 
process, they have had no systematic effect on substantive policy.45
Moreover, political scientists raise two concerns about discretion.46  First, 
administrators may use their discretion to limit access to benefits and protection.47
Second, because decisions may be influenced by moral or political judgments, discretion 
may be used to discriminate or harm specific categories of clients.48   For example, 
internal bureaucratic procedures play an important role in defining the right to 
information under Canadian freedom of information statutes.49  Likewise, the “good 
cause” requirement allowing deviation from child support enforcement (in cases where 
the recipient fears abuse from the obligor or where the child had been conceived as the 
result of incest or rape)50 allows discretion that is sensitive to political influences.51
Discretion on how to spend money at local school district level allowed administrators to 
45 Id. at 117-18.
46 Lael R. Keiser & Joe Soss, With Good Cause:  Bureaucratic Discretion and the Politics of Child 
Support Enforcement, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1133, 1134 (1998) (finding that use of the good cause exception 
which allows a custodial parent to refuse to seek child support was "systemically affected by partisan 
control of state governments, the values of state administrators, the funding decisions of elected officials, 
and the levels of demand on the bureaucracy”).
47 Id. (citing Michael Lipsey, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. 
SERV. REV. 3, 3-5 (1984)).
48 Id. (citing Yaheskel Hasenfeld, Power in Social Work Practice, 61 Soc. Serv. Rev. 469 (1987) and 
Gideon Sjoberg et al, Bureaucracy and the Lower Class, 50 SOC. & SOC. RES. 325 (1966).
49 Alasdair Roberts, Administrative Discretion and the Access to Information Act:  An “Internal 
Law” on Open Government, 45 CANADIAN PUB. ADMIN. 175 (2002) (finding that requests for government 
information from the media or political parties are subject to longer delays and tougher decisions on 
disclosure).
50 The current good cause exception is at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(2003); see generally Naomi Stern, 
Battered by the System:  How Advocates Against Domestic Violence have Improved Victims’ Access to 
Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 49 (2003).
51 Keiser and Soss, supra note 35 at 1147.
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discriminate racially in hiring and in directing black students to less desirable educational 
programs.52
Our study reveals both types of concerns mentioned by Keiser and Soss.  First, 
despite the mandate of the statutes and regulations, the investigators apparently limited 
the protection available to some dependent elders where they were not convinced that the 
involvement of APS would benefit them.53  Secondly, administrators who might be 
biased in favor of child protective services instead of APS but who were assigned to do 
both did not investigate or substantiate as many cases of elder abuse.54  Though we do not 
have access to the amounts spent in APS on the local level, we are certain that material 
resources play a strong role in shaping administrative performance.55  Thus because they 
are acting under conditions of scarcity, they are pushed into a variety of strategies for 
conserving and rationing resources,56 which strategies translate into understaffing.57
Overburdened workers distributing scarce resources may simply ignore clients’ needs.
This, of course, is the rub:  in a time of financial constraint, what goals have the 
highest priority?  Where the goals of the supervising agency or legislature are obscure, 
those who implement them have great authority to do whatever they wish.  Where they 
are set forth in legislation, rules, or directives, the bureaucrats implementing the goals 
will tend to follow these stated goals explicitly.  Our conclusion is that state legislatures, 
52 Kenneth J. Meier, Joseph Stewart. Jr. & Robert E. England, The Politics of Bureaucratic 
Discretion:  Educational Access as an Urban Service, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 145 (1991) (arguing that school 
desegregation plans face lower levels of white resistance than in years past and should be expanded in 
scope).
53 See infra, Tables 2 & 5.
54 See infra, Tables 2 & 5.
55 Charles Barrileaux, Richard Reiock, & Robert E. Crew, Jr., Measuring and Comparing American 
States’ Administrative Characteristics, 24 ST. & GOV’T REV. 441 (1992).
56 MICHAEL LIPSKY, MICHAEL, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:  DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES.  (Russell Sage Foundation 1980).
57 JEFFREY M. PROTTAS, PEOPLE-PROCESSING:  THE STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRAT IN PUBLIC 
SERVICE BUREAUCRACIES (Lexington Books 1979).  Lynn Okamoto, House Panel OKs Budget-Cutting 
Bill:  Local Governments, Children’s Advocates Not Happy, DES MOINES REGISTER, April 23, 2003 at B1.
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and the bureaucrats who administer their programs, must pay careful attention to the 
messages they send about elder abuse.  If in fact protecting elders from abuse is a 
priority, as it is for us, both levels of state government must send clear signals about how 
their goals are to be implemented.  They must also decide on strategies:  protective or 
preventative.  Currently, most state governments apparently have chosen the protective 
strategy, which may not be what either the elders want nor what makes the investigators 
most comfortable.  Policymakers must make their commitments and choices clear both in 
terms of the wording of statutes and regulations and in terms of funding and personnel 
adequate for the task.
Methods
The collaborators on this study, after obtaining University of Iowa Institutional 
Review Board approval, employed two methods to obtain data involving domestic elder 
abuse at the local level: a mailed survey and a compilation of state elder abuse data.  Data 
gathered for analysis included, first, answers to a questionnaire from a caseworker in 
each APS office in the country, which differentiated investigative structure and 
investigator characteristics and, second, reports of the number of domestic elder abuse 
reports, investigations, and substantiations at the lowest reporting level for each state and 
the District of Columbia for 1999 or fiscal year 1999-2000.
Elder abuse data originally comes from an administrative office whose employees 
investigate allegations of elder abuse.  The state structure for each office varies.  There 
may be one office per county, as in Wisconsin, an office that covers more than one 
county, as in Iowa, an office that covers parts of counties, as in New Mexico, or an office 
that covers numerous cities in many counties, as in Massachusetts.  Data on elder abuse 
12
are collected using these different structures and this data is then compiled at the state 
level to generate an annual report.  Thus, the data generated may be at the county level, 
the city level, or a district level that has numerous counties or a part of a county.  When 
we use the term, “data at the lowest reporting level,” we denote the elder abuse reports, 
investigations, and substantiations of investigations at whichever lowest reporting entity 
the state provided, based upon its individual system.
Elder Abuse Data
In November, 2000, the authors sent each state APS administrator a letter 
requesting specific data for this study.  Data requested included the numbers of domestic 
elder abuse58 reports, investigations, and substantiation of investigations at the lowest 
reporting entity for 1999 or fiscal year 1999-2000.  The reporters were asked to omit 
institutional abuse numbers and numbers of abuse against people age 18-59 years of age. 
 All state APS administrators were contacted within two weeks of the initial letter.  
Georgia and North Dakota reported that they had no data to provide.  Colorado provided 
data but was unsure of its accuracy.  The Colorado data was ultimately not used in the 
study.  Seven states provided data only at the statewide level:  Alaska, Indiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont.  States that provided data at the 
lowest reporting level did so at the county or district level.  Twenty-five states provided 
data at the county level, and 16 states provided data at the district level.  Rhode Island 
was unable to provide self-neglect data; otherwise all states provided comprehensive 
58 This included all types of abuse such as physical abuse, exploitation, neglect, sexual abuse, 
abandonment, emotional abuse, and any other categories specified in state law.
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numbers for abuse.  The data collection process was completed in 13 months, with an 
average of 25 telephone calls and a range of 1 to 32 calls per state to obtain the data.59
Questionnaire
The collaborators then mailed a survey designed to differentiate investigative 
structure and investigator characteristics.  Prior to mailing, permission to conduct the 
survey was sought from each state's APS administrator.  Forty-five of the states’ 
administrators (44 states and the District of Columbia) provided permission.  Montana’s 
APS administrator allowed the survey to be sent only via email. 
Five states (Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee) 
did not grant permission for questionnaires to be sent to each local office.  Three of those 
states (Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee) completed one questionnaire representing all 
APS offices in the state.  Data collected from these three states were not used in the final 
analysis.  South Dakota offered to complete the questionnaires in a group meeting.  
However, this format was not acceptable to the study team.  North Dakota could not 
participate because there were no adult protective service offices in the state.
The word investigator is used throughout this analysis.  Caseworker or APS 
worker terms were usually avoided because the focus of the research was on the 
investigation of elder abuse and the questionnaire was about the investigations, not the 
provision of services.  As noted previously, caseworkers and APS workers typically 
provide services in addition to investigating allegations.
59 See Jogerst et al., AJPH 2003, for further details.
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Instrument
The research team developed a 23-item questionnaire entitled "State Elder Abuse 
Investigations" for use in this study.  Demographic items included respondent’s position 
title, age, gender, length of employment in current position, level of education, and full-
time or part-time work status.  Other items pertained to investigations conducted by the 
agency, such as the use of abuse screens, the number of full-time equivalent investigators, 
and whether the agency offered and used a curriculum (that is, a formal program of 
instruction about elder abuse investigation).
The questionnaire underwent initial revisions following suggestions generated by 
the geriatric assessment clinic team (physicians, nurse practitioner, social worker, and 
nurse) and the research review team (University of Iowa Department of Internal and 
Family Medicine).  The questionnaire was then pilot tested by ten social workers, each of 
whom works with elder and adult abuse investigations in the Iowa City, Iowa area.  
Following feedback from the social workers, the collaborators made final revisions to the 
survey.  
Mailings and Telephone Follow-up
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An APS director, supervisor, or investigator from each APS office was sent a 
questionnaire.  The first mailing of 1,860 questionnaires resulted in a return of 728 
surveys (39%).  A second mailing was sent to those who had not yet returned the first 
survey.  Of the 1,191 offices that received the second mailing, 366 (31%) returned the 
survey.  Following the second mailing, surveys from the first mailing were received, thus 
some APS offices inadvertently received a second mailing.  Surveys returned from the 
second mailing were cross-referenced with those received from the first mailing.  In cases 
of duplication, surveys returned from the first mailing were used.  In total, 1,056 surveys 
(60%) were returned by mail.
Twenty questionnaires were emailed from their administrator to investigators 
housed in different offices in Montana; eight were returned by email.  A “reminder” 
questionnaire was emailed a month later to the 12 investigators who did not return the 
first questionnaire.  None of the second emailed surveys were returned.
Two rounds of follow-up telephone calls were made to 701 offices that had not 
returned a questionnaire from either mailing.  The first round of calls resulted in 216 
completed surveys and the second round resulted in another 129 completions.  During the 
telephone calling sessions, we realized that some offices had been re-districted, so the 
actual number of offices to receive the questionnaires was 1,763.
All three methods of data collection resulted in the completion of 1,409 
questionnaires, for a final return rate of 80%.  Survey response rates ranged from 36% in 
Utah to 100% in nine states.  
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Dependent and Independent Variables
There were four dependent variables for the initial analysis.  The first three were 
rates:  1) elder abuse report rates, 2) investigation rates, and 3) substantiation rates.  
These rates were determined by dividing the number of reports, investigations, and 
substantiations, respectively, by the total elder population of the unit.  The fourth 
dependent variable is the substantiation ratio, determined by dividing substantiations by 
investigations.  Total elder population covered by the APS statute was 60 years and older 
for all states except California, Maryland, and Nebraska, where it was 65 years and older, 
and for Alabama, which was 55 years and older.  Population data were obtained from the 
April 1, 2000 U.S. Census.60 For this study, a report means an allegation of abuse 
received by APS.61  An investigation is conducted after a report is received to evaluate 
the potential victim.  Substantiation means that the investigator finds that abuse actually 
exists (is founded) according to state law.
The independent (predictor) variables included questions from the survey 
regarding the investigative system, educational requirements, investigator characteristics, 
and demographic data.  Investigative system items included whether or not the office 
used abuse screens,62 whether the same person investigated both child and adult cases, 
the number of full time equivalents investigating child and elder abuse allegations, the 
respondent’s opinion about whether an elderly person is better off after intervention, and 
60 These are available on the Census Website, www.census.gov.  
61 Reports are not studied or discussed in this paper, but are discussed in other work of the 
collaborators.
62 For example, the Maine Partners for Elder Protection website includes the following:
A combination of paper and electronic brief screens administered during routine medical 
appointments will identify patients 60 years and older that are at risk of elder abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation. An elder care specialist will assess and respond to patient need. 
Education workshops and information will be provided to PCPs in the region as well as 
AAA staff.  
http://www.umaine.edu/mainecenteronaging/mepep.htm
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the respondent’s opinion about whether elder abuse is reported and substantiated 
adequately.  Educational requirement items included the department’s curriculum for 
elder abuse evaluations, and the length of any curriculum.  Investigator characteristics 
items included the investigators’ minimum academic level of education, the percent of 
investigators with education beyond the minimum requirements, and the investigators’ 
area of educational training.  Demographic items included respondent’s position title, 
age, gender, length of employment in current position, level of education, and full-time or 
part-time work status.    We also considered various district demographic variables, 
obtained from government web sites.
Analyses
This article looks at the effect of discretion and other variables on three outcomes:  
investigation rates, substantiation rates, and the ratio between the two, all measured at the 
local reporting unit level.  To improve normality for formal analyses of the former two 
outcomes, a fourth-root transformation was applied to the investigation and substantiation 
rates, but this was not necessary for the ratio.  
Simple Pearson correlations showed a significant (and negative) correlation 
between whether investigators considered both child and dependent adult abuse within 
their offices and whether they felt that elders were “usually better off” after adult 
protective services investigations.  
In some ways, the discretion problem highlighted in this paper resembles the 
concerns that culminated in arguments for the Violence Against Women’s Act 
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(VAWA).63  Its proponents argued that specific legislation was needed because the 
general public, police, prosecutors and judges underestimated the extent and effect of 
attacks directed against women.  Because they did so, judges were apt to focus on the 
actions of the victim leading to abuse64 and, even when the criminal offense was proved, 
to pronounce sentences significantly less than the crimes deserved.65  The upshot was that 
as a group or class women were disadvantaged.66  VAWA was designed as a clear 
statement from Congress, which made the criminality of abusers’ actions manifest and 
authorized sufficient money and education for law enforcement to tackle the problem.67
Like partner violence, domestic abuse against the elderly tends to be ignored, blamed on 
the victim, or trivialized.  Like violence by intimates, violence against the elderly is 
63 Pub. L. No. 103-322, §40201, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg(b)(2).  United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), struck down as exceeding Congress’ legislative authority under the 
Commerce Clause the civil remedy portion of the statutory scheme.
64 Senator Biden, in introducing the Act, explained in 103d Congress 1st Session, Senate Report 103-
138 – The Violence Against Women Act of 1993 – September 10, 1993 at 38:
Its goals are both symbolic and practical; the act is intended to educate the public and those within 
the justice system against the archaic prejudices that blame women for the beatings and the rapes 
they suffer; to the women the support and the assurance that their attackers will be prosecuted; and 
to ensure that the focus of criminal proceedings will concentrate on the conduct of the attacker 
rather than the conduct of the victim.
65 Id. at  37-38:  
The Violence Against Women Act is intended to respond both to the underlying attitude that this violence 
is somehow less serious than other crime and to the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to 
address such violence.  
66 Biden continued:
It is time for attacks motivated by gender basis to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by religious, 
racial, or political bias.  The provision’s purpose is to provide an effective anti-discrimination remedy for 
violently expressed gender prejudice.
Id. at 38.
67 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg(b)(2)  provides in (b) Purposes for which grants may be used
Grants under this subchapter shall provide personnel, training, technical assistance, 
data collection and other equipment for the more widespread apprehension, prosecution, 
and adjudication of persons committing violent crimes against women, and specifically, 
for the purposes of--
(1) training law enforcement officers, judges, other court personnel, and prosecutors to 
more effectively identify and respond to violent crimes against women, including the 
crimes of sexual assault, domestic violence, and dating violence;
(2) developing, training, or expanding units of law enforcement officers, judges, other court 
personnel, and prosecutors specifically targeting violent crimes against women, including the 
crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence…
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directed in the main against women.68  Violence against the elderly is also by definition 
directed against those in positions of dependence. 69  Dependents are elsewhere 
specifically recognized when they are children70 or disabled.71  This paper considers 
68 Elder violence tends to be directed against women because they make up such a large percentage 
of those old enough to become dependent:
Number of Men per 100 Women by Age, for the 65 Years and Over Population:1990 and 2000
Age 1990 2000
65 years and over 67 70
65-74 78 82
75-84 60 65
85 years and older 39 41
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1; 1990 Census of Population, General 
Population Characteristics, United States (1990 CP-1-1).
69 Many elder abuse statutes specifically focus prosecutions on those who abuse “dependent and 
vulnerable” adults, not just people who are over a certain age.    For example, Ky Rev. Stat. 209.020 
defines "Adult [in need of protection]" as: (a) A person eighteen (18) years of age or older, who because of 
mental or physical dysfunctioning, is unable to manage his own resources or carry out the activity of daily 
living or protect himself from neglect, or a hazardous or abusive situation without assistance from others, 
and who may be in need of protective services.  Miss. Code Ann. § § 43-47-5 (m) provides that:
 "Vulnerable adult" shall mean a person eighteen (18) years of age or older or any minor 
not covered by the Youth Court Act who is present in the state and who, regardless of 
residence, is unable to protect his or her own rights, interests, and/or vital concerns and 
who cannot seek help without assistance because of physical, mental or emotional 
impairment.
70 Legislation and cases protecting children frequently mention that juveniles are in a more 
vulnerable position than adults and need more compassion, understanding, and special treatment.  Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 633-39 (1978) (vulnerability and therefore need of special treatment of children 
who are pregnant); DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, 104 P.L. 193, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), establishing the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program; the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
89, 111 Stat. 2115, codified as amended,  42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 675, 473A, 1320a-9. 629a (1994 & Supp. V 
1995-2000); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 547 
(2000) (“American lawmakers have had relatively clear images of childhood and adulthood--images that fit 
with our conventional notions. Children are innocent beings, who are dependent, vulnerable, and incapable 
of making competent decisions. Several aspects of the legal regulation of childhood are based on this 
account.”).
71 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (discrimination against the disabled is 
often the result of thoughtless and indifferent attitudes); Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (prohibition against discrimination in employment); Peter D. 
Blanck & Mollie W. Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 368-69 & n.111 (1996) (examining emerging empirical information 
related to attitudes and behavior under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, discussing the 
implications of the findings for future policymaking and implementation in this area); Catherine J. Ross, 
From Vulnerability to Voice:  Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1571, 1606-07 (1996): “Vulnerable groups -- including children, persons with special needs, and those with 
mental disabilities -- like other disadvantaged groups in our society, may require special consideration from 
the courts in order to realize their rights. Therefore, courts have held that certain classes of vulnerable
persons require special services tailored to their differing abilities in order to level the playing field and 
assure that access to the courts is truly meaningful.
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whether adult protective service investigators, who are given great discretion under 
statutes and regulations, have incentives compatible with the interests of the elderly they 
serve.  In particular, we investigate whether those who investigate both elder and child 
abuse receive hidden signals from lawmakers that elder abuse should not receive their 
highest priority.
Because we knew about the high correlation between variables for “same 
investigator” and “whether the elder is usually better off,” we did not include both 
variables in any equation as independent variables:  in those where we wished to look at 
both together, we considered “usually better off” as the endogenous variable.72   In other 
words, we treated it as a function of other factors including whether investigators were 
specialized or whether they handled both child and elder abuse.
First, we considered determinants of investigation rates.  We first ran two very 
simple models to see whether the discretion variables of interest were significantly 
related to the investigation rates.  State effect was adjusted for here, as in all the 
Studies of the over-inclusion of disabled children among the abused include:  Margaret F. Brinig  
& F.H. Buckley, Parental Rights and The Ugly Duckling, 1 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 41, 56 (1999) (finding that 
victims of abuse are often different from other children, either because they are disabled or in need of 
ongoing care); William N. Friedrich & Allison J. Einbender, The Abused Child:  A Psychological Review, 
12 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCH. 244-56 (1983) (higher rates of abuse among disabled children); Lawrence E. 
Frisch & Frances A. Thoads, Child Abuse and Neglect in Children Referred for Learning Evaluation, 15 J. 
OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 583 (1982)(three times the expected number of abused children found in a 
learning disabled population in Hawaii); Elizabeth Krents et al., Child Abuse and the Disabled Child:  
Perspectives for parents, 89 THE VOLTA REVIEW 78, 83 (1987); William A. Friedrich & Jerry A. Boriskin, 
The Role of the Child in Abuse:  A Review of the Literature, 46 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 580, 583-84 
(1987) (reporting that 25 to 55% of children in various studies of abused children were classified as 
mentally retarded.); Roger White et al., Physical Disabilities as Risk Factors for Child Maltreatment:  A 
Selected Review, 51 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 93, 96 (1987) (showing positive relationship).  See generally 
SHARON R. MORGAN, ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN (1987); Robert E. Emery & Lisa 
Laurman-Billings, An Overview of the Nature, Causes and Consequences of Abusive Family Relationships:  
Toward Differentiating Maltreatment and Violence, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 121, 126 (1998) (discussing a 
number of risk factors).
72 That is, we thought it likely that being an investigator in both types of cases influenced whether 
the reporter felt the elder would usually be better off as a result of the intervention.
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regression models.73  Both variables in fact were statistically significant at .01,74 having 
the same investigator coefficient negative and “usually better off” positive (Table 2).  
These equations predicted .07 and .09 of the variance in the investigation rate, 
respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 show regressions designed to handle the correlation between these 
two variables and to allow other variables to be introduced.  Table 3 displays the equation 
predicting whether or not the investigator mailed the survey felt the elder was “usually 
better off” because of adult protective services.  Having the same investigator handle both 
types of abuse rather than specialize again was significant and negative.  Those who had 
worked for APS for long periods of time were also pessimistic about whether the elder 
usually profits from their services (significant at .028).  The death rate from all alcohol-
related causes in the reporting district, which we believe related to the actual abuse rate in 
the district, was negatively related to the “usually better off” variable (significant at .058), 
while the length of the formal elder abuse curriculum was positively related (though not 
achieving statistical significance).
The predicted probability of the investigator’s feeling the elder was “usually 
better off” obtained from the preceding regression was used as an independent variable in 
Table 4, along with other variables, and was able to explain .118 of the variance in 
investigation rates.  Here, too, it was significant and positive as expected:  if the 
investigator was optimistic about the effect of the abuse on the elderly victim, the rate of 
investigations increased.  Another expected (and significant) predictor was the child 
poverty rate, which tends to be related to the amount of abuse.  Two predictors had 
73 There might be other things typical to a particular state that influenced the results.  To account for 
this, the general profile for any given state was treated as a variable (and held constant).  
74 This means that there was less than one chance out of 100 that our result occurred by chance.
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surprising signs.  The variable for health care providers per population was negative, but 
not significant.  The value of elder abuse investigators per elderly population was 
negative and significant at the .08 level.  These negative relationships might be related to 
a lower level of abuse:  potential abusers might be deterred either because they feared 
more reporting because of more health care professionals (usually mandatory reporters) 
or more investigators, or perhaps both variables reflect increased funding for elder care 
issues generally, and so a lower level of abuse because of more services.
Similarly, we ran simple and slightly more complicated regressions for the 
substantiation rates (Table 5).  The simplest regressions (Models 1 and 2), which 
included the state effects and the two discretion variables of interest, again showed 
significant relationships (negative for “same investigator” and positive for “elder usually 
better off.”  This time, they predicted just under five percent of the variance in each 
result.  Two additional equations considered the effect of having specialized (different) or 
the same investigators with the addition of other variables (Models 3 and 4).  Both 
considered the effect of the formal elder abuse curriculum on the substantiation rate, and 
in both this coefficient was significant and positive.  Model 4 adds two additional 
variables, the elder poverty rate and the APS/elderly rate.  The elder poverty rate is 
positive and significant, as one would suspect, since this is probably related to the amount 
of abuse itself or perhaps the general wealth in the state.  The APS worker/population rate 
is negative and significant.  Remember that this holds constant the effect of specialization 
in adult protective services:  merely adding additional investigators does not apparently 
increase the substantiation rate.  Again, this may be because of a deterrent effect, or may 
reflect the money generally available to support programs for the elderly.
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Table 6, like Table 4, is a Two-Stage Least Squares regression using the predicted 
values for “elder usually better off” from Table 3, this time to predict substantiation rates.  
In this equation, the predicted value, state effect, the elder poverty rate and the rate of 
elder investigator/elderly population were variables of interest, and predicted .169 of the 
variance in substantiation rates.  The predicted value, as expected, was positively and 
significantly related to the substantiation rate, as was the elder poverty rate.  This time the 
rate of APS investigators was positive (though not significant).
Finally, Table 7 shows several models predicting the substantiation/investigation 
ratio, or which might be described as APS efficiency.  Models 1 and 2 again show the 
simple regressions for the same investigator and “elder usually better off.”  In neither of 
these was the discretion variable statistically significant.  Model 3 therefore includes a 
number of other variables which are all positive and significant and together predict 
about ten percent of the variance in this ratio.  These include the health care provider rate, 
the minimum academic requirements for the investigators, and the number of APS 
investigators/elderly population.  The fact that there is a positive sign on this last variable 
means that hiring additional investigators does have a beneficial effect once the actual 
amount of abuse is controlled for (through the substantiation and investigation rates):  it 
does make the investigations more efficient.
Discussion
There is evidence of a wide variation for report, investigation, and substantiation 
rates across states and among counties.  We are unaware of any nationwide study 
suggesting that actual elder abuse, considered on its own, should very from state to state 
or county to county.   In an earlier study by investigators from the University of Iowa, 
24
Iowa county level community characteristics related to higher rates of investigated or 
substantiated elder abuse were population density, children in poverty, reported child 
abuse, and district.75 Another investigator reported that in Massachusetts, areas with 
lower socioeconomic status of the older population, more community training of area 
professionals, higher agency service rating scores, and a lower community agency-
protective service relationship score are more likely to have a higher rate of elder abuse 
reporting than affluent areas.76  Our findings are certainly not inconsistent with these 
results.
We found that those respondents who perceived a person to be better off most of 
the time after investigation and intervention did have higher investigation and 
substantiation rates, signifying that investigator perceptions of efficacy do influence 
investigation and substantiation rates.  If an investigator perceives that the elder will be 
helped, he or she is more likely to investigate and to find abuse.
The investigators’ academic preparation as well as more training for their 
investigator role does seem to affect their efficiency to substantiate abuse (substantiation 
ratio).  Specific training about elder abuse (what to look for and what should be done 
about it) apparently does have beneficial effects.
The only structural detail that predicted statistically significant higher 
investigation or substantiation rates was whether the reporting district used separate 
investigators for child and elder abuse cases.  Those investigators only addressing elder 
75 Gerald J. Jogerst et al., Community Characteristics Associated with Elder Abuse. 48 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC. 513 (2000) (finding, among other things, that the child abuse rate and the proportion of 
children in poverty were good predictors of elder abuse).
76 Rosalie S. Wolf & Donglin Li, Factors Affecting the Rate of Elder Abuse Reporting to a State 
Protective Services Program, 39  THE GERONTOLOGIST 222 (1999) (lower socioeconomic status, more 
training, less good relationship between community agency and served population had higher reporting).
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abuse cases may acquire more experience and expertise about elder abuse than those 
investigating both child and elder abuse cases.  Specialization thus leads to higher 
investigation and substantiation rates.  
It is reasonable and cost effective to have one caseworker conducting 
investigations of both child and elder allegations of abuse when the population served is 
sparse and there is only one caseworker.  But it is evident from these findings that higher 
investigation and substantiation rates are possible for those investigators conducting only 
investigations of elder abuse rather than both child and elder abuse.  These specialists in 
elder care will be more effective with more prior training in elder abuse.
Conclusion
In an era of shrinking state and local resources for domestic violence prevention 
and detection, governments face a critical question of how to best allocate scarce funds.
This paper suggests some answers for treating family violence, and presents a model for 
evaluating other programs.
 Some expensive programs produce very few results in terms of reporting, 
investigating, and substantiating elder abuse.  For example, requiring a specific education 
or experience level (and therefore guaranteeing higher salaries) or even instituting an 
elder abuse training program (expensive in terms of personnel required, record keeping 
and time taken off field work) in and of themselves made no statistical difference.  It also 
appears to make no difference whether the APS program is administered on the state or 
local level, or whether the investigators used screening devices as opposed to a more 
gestalt approach.
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 However, three factors do apparently contribute significantly to investigator 
effectiveness.  The first, whether the investigator believes that intervention makes elders
better off, sounds like a psychological issue.  It probably reflects, however, the placement 
and program alternatives the survey respondents had available.  Money could perhaps be 
saved from reducing education or training requirements and spent instead on services 
such as respite care and homemaking services for the caretakers.  This is the response 
suggested from his work with other types of family abusers by Wolfe.77
 Another very significant group of results involved specialization for APS personnel.
Holding constant state effects including laws and socioeconomic characteristics, workers 
who specialized in APS (rather than doing both child and adult investigations) 
consistently did significantly better.  Similarly, those with longer (as opposed to merely 
token) training programs also had higher rates of investigation and substantiation.  The 
policy recommendation seems clear.  Instead of worrying about training all social 
workers to detect elder abuse, we urge that the resources should be concentrated on the 
social workers exclusively focusing on APS.
77 Wolfe (2003), supra note 7 at 516-517. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Same Investigator 
Elder and Child 1393 0 1 .27 .443
Most Elders Better 
Off 1392 0 1 .69 .463
Length of Formal 
Elder Abuse 
Curriculum
825 1 6 3.97 1.188
Highest Academic 
Level 1395 1 7 3.00 .756
County High School 
Graduation Rate 1241 35.5 94.9 71.163 10.5637
Investigations Per 
Thousand Elders 1235 .0 150.0 6.132 8.2483
Substantiations Per 
Thousand Elders 1237 0 117 2.67 5.535
Ratio of 
Substantiations to 
Investigations
1196 .00 1.00 .3801 .28936
Health Care 
Providers Per 
Population
945 .00 .73 .0086 .03332
Elder Abuse 
Investigators Per 
Elderly Population
999 .0 13 .421 .8250
Valid N (listwise) 429
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Table 2.  Determinants of Investigation Rates.* **
 Investigation Rate (4th Root)
Model 1 
R2=.07
Model 2 
R2=.09 
State Effects -.001 
(.001)
-.001 
(.001)
Same Investigator for Child and 
Elder Abuse
-.281 
(.033)**
Investigator Feels Elderly Usually 
Better Off
.157 
(.168)**
(Constant) 1.498 
(.028) **
1.326 
(.035)**
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Table 3.  Logistic Regression: Determinants of Whether Elder Usually Better Off, R2=.045 (pre_1)
B S.E. Sig. Exp(B)
State Effect
.003 .006 .594 1.003
Same Investigator for 
Child and Elder Abuse -.676 .207 .001 .509
Length of Employment 
of Respondent -.002 .001 .028 .998
Alcohol Death Rate in 
County -.013 .007 .058 .987
Length of Elder Abuse 
Curriculum .126 .080 .118 1.134
Constant 1.272 .477 .008 3.570
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Table 4.  2SLS Investigation Rates, Same Investigator is exogenous, as are Length of Employment of 
Respondent, Alcoholism Rate, Length of Elder Abuse Curriculum.   R2=.118, system .360.
Variable B Standard Error Beta T Sig. T
State Effect .002310 .001365 .093958 1.692 .0915
Predicted 
“Elder Usually 
better Off”
1.025403 .407341 .225811 2.517 .0122
Elder Abuse 
Investigators 
Per Elderly 
Population
-.207023 .118453 -.339145 -1.748 .0813
Child Poverty 
Rate
.013347 .004305 .359201 3.100 .0021
Health Care 
Providers Per 
Population
-.830454 .626349 -.070670 -1.326 .1857
(Constant) .479362 .365341 1.312 .1903
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Table 5,  Determinants of Substantiation Rates.* **
Substantiation Rate (4th Root)
Model 1 
R2=.048
Model 2 
R2=.049
Model 3 
R2=.119
Model 4 
R2=.210
Model 5 
R2=.094
State Effect .008 
(.001)**
.008 
(.001)**
.012
(.002)**
.026
(.003)**
.030
(.013)*
Same Investigator for Child 
and Adult -.126 (046)** -.128 (.053)**
-.507
(.140)**
Elder Usually Better Off
.134 (.041)** .899(.068)*
Elder Poverty Rate .030
(.007)**
Child Poverty Rate .049
(.023)*
Length of Curriculum on 
Elders
.082
(.020)**
.175
(.038)**
(Constant) .711 
(.040)**
.590 
(.048)**
.283 
(.095)**
-.545
(.194)**
-.536
(.676)
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Table 6.  2SLS Determinants of Substantiation Rates Using Predicted Value from Table 3.  
R2=.169, system .419
Variable B Standard Error Beta T Sig. T
Predicted 
Value of 
“Thinks 
Usually Better 
Off”
1.757272 .429018 .268147 4.096 .0000
Over 65 
Poverty Rate
.030002 .010514 .326505 2.854 .0045
Rate of Elder 
Investigators 
Per Elderly 
Population
.039021 .038265 .050238 1.020 .3083
State Effect .015946 .001711 .389462 9.321 .0000
(Constant) -1.180330 .412473 -2.862 .0044
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Table 7.  Determinants of Substantiation/Investigation Ratio.**
Coefficients 
Model 1
R2=.057
Model 2
R2=.058
Model 3
 R2=.103
State Effect .004 
(.001)**
.004 
(.001)**
.005 
(.001)**
Same Investigator for Elder and Child Abuse .020 
(.023)
Elder Usually Better Off .025 
(.020)
Health Care Provider  Rate .990 
(.422)**
Length of Formal Elder Abuse Curriculum .030 
(.011)**
Minimum Academic Requirements .030
 (.017)*
Number of Elder Abuse Investigators/Elderly Population .041 
(.089)*
(Constant) .236 
(.023)**
.249 
(.019)**
-.045 
(.074)
*To improve normality, a fourth-root transformation was applied to the 
investigation and substantiation rates.  
**Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  + denotes significance at .10. * 
denotes significance at .05. ** denotes significance at .01.
